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Abstract—This paper proposes a new transmit antenna se-
lection (TAS) scheme which provides enhanced physical layer
security in multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap chan-
nels. The practical passive eavesdropping scenario we consider is
where channel state information (CSI) from the eavesdropper is
not available at the transmitter. Our new scheme is carried out in
two steps. First, the transmitter selects the first two strongest an-
tennas based on the feedback from the receiver, which maximizes
the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the transmitter-
receiver channel. Second, the Alamouti scheme is employed at
the selected antennas in order to perform data transmission. At
the receiver and the eavesdropper, maximal-ratio combining is
applied in order to exploit the multiple antennas. We derive a new
closed-form expression for the secrecy outage probability in non-
identical Rayleigh fading, and using this result, we then present
the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity in closed form and
the ε-outage secrecy capacity in numerical form. We demonstrate
that our proposed TAS-Alamouti scheme offers lower secrecy
outage probability than a single TAS scheme when the SNR of
the transmitter-receiver channel is above a specific value.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security in wireless communication networks
has recently gained considerable research interest [1]. The
core concept behind this paradigm is to exploit the properties
of a wireless channel, such as fading or noise, to promote
secrecy for wireless transmission [2]. Physical layer security,
in principle, eliminates the requirement for complex higher-
layer secrecy techniques, such as encryption and cryptographic
key management. In early pioneering studies [3–5], the wiretap
channel was characterized as the fundamental framework
within which to protect information at the physical layer. In
the wiretap channel where the transmitter (commonly known
as Alice), the receiver (Bob) and the eavesdropper (Eve) are
equipped with a single antenna, it was proved that perfect
secrecy can be achieved if the eavesdropper’s channel between
Alice and Eve is worse than the main channel between Alice
and Bob. Motivated by emerging multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) techniques, there is a growing interest in
investigating the MIMO wiretap channel [6, 7]. In the MIMO
wiretap channel where Alice, Bob, and/or Eve are equipped
with multiple antennas, it was established that the perfect
secrecy can be guaranteed via beamforming with/without
artificial noise even if the quality of the eavesdropper’s channel
is higher than that of the main channel [8, 9].
When the CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel is not available
at Alice, perfect secrecy can not be guaranteed. In this
circumstance, the secrecy performance is investigated from
the perspective of wireless channel statistics. Correspondingly,
secrecy outage probability is adopted as a practical and im-
portant performance metric to evaluate the probability that
the actual transmission rate is larger than the instantaneous
secrecy capacity [10]. To avoid the high feedback overhead
and high signal processing cost required by beamforming,
transmit antenna selection (TAS) was proposed to enhance
physical layer security in MIMO wiretap channels [11, 12].
In this TAS scheme, only one antenna is selected at Alice
to maximize the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of
the main channel. Throughout this paper, we refer to this
scheme as single TAS. Single TAS significantly reduces the
feedback overhead and hardware complexity, since only the
index of the selected transmit antenna is fed back from the
receiver and only one radio-frequency chain is implemented
at the transmitter. Motivated by this, [11] derived the secrecy
outage probability of single TAS for the wiretap channel with
multiple antennas at Alice and Eve but a single antenna at
Bob. A general wiretap channel model with multiple antennas
at Alice, Bob, and Eve was investigated in [12], in which
the performance of single TAS with maximal-ratio combining
(MRC) or selection combining (SC) was thoroughly examined
in Rayleigh fading. Considering versatile Nakagami-m fading,
[13] analyzed the secrecy performance of single TAS.
In general, the practicality of TAS schemes is determined
by not only the achievable performance but the incurred
feedback overhead and hardware complexity. As such, it is
possible to select more than one antenna at the transmitter
for transmission. For such multi-antenna selection schemes,
effective coding strategies need to be incorporated according
to the number of selected antennas [14]. A practical example
is the Alamouti scheme which offers full diversity order [15].
Against this background, [16] proposed a new TAS-Alamouti
scheme in MIMO systems without secrecy constraints. In
this scheme, two transmit antennas are selected at the trans-
mitter and the Alamouti scheme is adopted to perform data
transmission through the selected antennas. Notably, it was
observed in [16] that the performance of TAS-Alamouti is
worse than that of single TAS in MIMO systems without
secrecy constraints. The reason for this observation lies in the
fact that TAS-Alamouti wastes transmit energy on the second
selected antenna.
In this paper, we examine the interesting questions: “Is the
secrecy performance in MIMO wiretap channels improved if
two antennas are selected at the transmitter instead of one?
And if so, by how much?” In order to address this question, we
propose TAS-Alamouti in MIMO wiretap channels to enhance
physical layer security. In this MIMO wiretap channel, Alice,
Bob, and Eve are equipped with NA, NB , and NE antennas,
respectively. In our proposed TAS-Alamouti scheme, the first
two strongest transmit antennas are selected at Alice and
the Alamouti scheme is applied at the two selected antennas
to carry out data transmission. At Bob and Eve, MRC is
applied to combine the received signals. To quantify the
performance of our scheme, we derive a new closed-form
expression for the secrecy outage probability. Based on this
result, we characterize the probability of non-zero secrecy
capacity and ε-outage secrecy capacity. Our key conclusion
is that our proposed TAS-Alamouti scheme achieves a lower
secrecy outage probability than the single TAS scheme when
the SNR of the main channel is in the medium and high regime
relative to the SNR of the eavesdropper’s channel. This useful
result is quite a surprising given the previous studies of similar
schemes in MIMO systems without secrecy constraints [16].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
details the system model and the proposed TAS-Alamouti
scheme. In Section III, the secrecy performance of the pro-
posed TAS-Alamouti scheme is analyzed. Numerical results
are presented in Section IV. Finally, Section V draws some
concluding remarks and future directions.
Notation: Scalar variables are denoted by italic symbols.
Vectors and matrices are denoted by lower-case and upper-
case boldface symbols, respectively. Given a complex vector x,
‖x‖ denotes the Euclidean norm, (x)T denotes the transpose
operation, and (x)† denotes the conjugate transpose operation.
The m×m identity matrix is referred to as Im.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROPOSED TAS-ALAMOUTI
Fig. 1 depicts the MIMO wiretap channel of interest, where
the transmitter (Alice), the receiver (Bob), and the eavesdrop-
per (Eve) are equipped with NA, NB , and NE antennas,
respectively. We assume that the main channel between Alice
and Bob and the eavesdropper’s channel between Alice and
Eve are subject to quasi-static Rayleigh fading. Under this
assumption, the fading coefficients are invariant during two
adjacent blocks of time durations within which the Alamouti
scheme is applied. We also assume the same fading block
length in the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel.
For such a wiretap channel, the passive eavesdropping scenario
is considered where Eve overhears the transmission between
Alice and Bob without inducing any interference to the main
channel. In this scenario, the instantaneous channel state in-
formation (CSI) of the eavesdropper’s channel is not available
at Alice. Of course, we preserve the assumption that Bob has
the full CSI of the main channel and Eve has the full CSI of
the eavesdropper’s channel.
We propose a TAS-Alamouti scheme to enhance the phys-
ical layer security in the MIMO wiretap channel of interest.
Specifically, the proposed scheme is performed in two steps.
We next detail the two steps, as follows:
Fig. 1. Illustration of a MIMO wiretap channel with NA, NB , and NE
antennas at Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively.
1) First Step – TAS: In the first step, the first two strongest
antennas out of NA antennas are selected at Alice. These
two antennas maximize the instantaneous SNR between Alice
and Bob. Here, Bob employs MRC to combine the received
signals. As per this criterion, the index of the first strongest
antenna is given by
α1 = argmax
0≤α≤NA
‖fα‖ (1)
and the index of the second strongest antenna is given by
α2 = argmax
0≤α≤NA,α6=α1
‖fα‖ . (2)
In (1) and (2), we denote fα = [fα,1, fα,2, ..., fα,NB ]T as the
NB × 1 channel vector between the α-th antenna at Alice
and the NB antennas at Bob with independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh fading entries.
To conduct antenna selection, Alice sends Bob pilot symbols
prior to data transmission. Using these symbols, Bob precisely
estimates the CSI of the main channel and determines α1 and
α2 according to (1) and (2). After that, Bob feeds back α1
and α2 to Alice via a low-rate feedback channel. As such,
our scheme reduces the feedback overhead compared with
beamforming, since only a small number of bits are required to
feedback the antenna indices. We note that the antenna indices
(1) and (2) are entirely dependent on the main channel. As
such, the two strongest transmit antennas for Bob corresponds
to two random transmit antennas for Eve. It follows that our
scheme improves the quality of main channel relative to the
eavesdropper’s channel, which in turn promotes the secrecy of
the wiretap channel.
2) Second Step – Alamouti: In the second step, Alice adopts
the Alamouti scheme to perform secure transmission at the two
selected antennas. After receiving the signals from Alice, Bob
applies MRC to combine the received signals and maximize
the SNR of the main channel. This allows Bob to exploit the
NB-antenna diversity and maximize the probability of secure
transmission. At the same time, Eve applies MRC to exploit
the NE-antenna diversity and maximize the probability of
successful eavesdropping.
As per the rules of the Alamouti scheme, the received signal
vectors at Bob in the first and second time slots are given by
yB(1) = [fα1 ,fα2 ]
[
x1
x2
]
+ n(1), (3)
and
yB(2) = [fα1 ,fα2 ]
[
−x†2
x†1
]
+ n(2), (4)
respectively, where [fα1 ,fα2 ] is the NB × 2 main channel
matrix after TAS, [x1, x2]T is the transmit signal vectors in the
first time slot, [−x†2, x
†
1]
T is the transmit signal vectors in the
second time slot, and n is the zero-mean circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian noise vector satisfying E[nn†] = INBσ2.
Under the power constraint, we have E[|x1|2] = E[|x2|2] ≤
PA/2, where PA is the total transmit power at Alice.
By performing MRC and space-time signal processing, the
signals at Bob are expressed as
y1B =
(
f†α1fα1 + f
†
α2
fα2
)
x1 + f
†
α1
n(1) + n(2)†fα2 , (5)
and
y2B =
(
f†α1fα1 + f
†
α2
fα2
)
x2 + f
†
α2
n(1)− n(2)†fα1 . (6)
Since n(1) and n(2) are independent from each other, the in-
stantaneous SNR at Bob for x1 is identical to the instantaneous
SNR at Bob for x2, which is written as
γB =
(‖fα1‖
2 + ‖fα2‖
2)PA
2σ2
. (7)
Following the same procedure as detailed above, the instan-
taneous SNR at Eve is written as
γE =
(‖gα1‖
2 + ‖gα2‖
2)PA
2σ2
, (8)
where [gα1 , gα2 ] is the NE× 2 eavesdropper’s channel matrix
after TAS and gα = [gα,1, gα,2, ..., gα,NE ]T denotes the NE×1
channel vector between the α-th antenna at Alice and the NE
antennas at Eve with i.i.d. Rayleigh fading entries.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE OF TAS-ALAMOUTI
In this section, we concentrate on the secrecy performance
of the proposed TAS-Alamouti scheme for non-identical
Rayleigh fading between the main channel and the eaves-
dropper’s channel. Specifically, we derive a new closed-form
expression for the secrecy outage probability. Based on this
result, we express the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
in closed form and present the ε-outage secrecy capacity in
integral form.
A. Secrecy Outage Probability
The secrecy outage probability is defined as the probability
of the secrecy capacity Cs being less than a specific transmis-
sion rate Rs (bits/channel) [10]. In the MIMO wiretap channel,
Cs is expressed as
Cs =
{
CB − CE , γB > γE
0 , γB ≤ γE ,
(9)
where CB = log2 (1 + γB) is the capacity of the main channel
and CE = log2 (1 + γE) is the capacity of the eavesdropper’s
channel. Here, γB is the instantaneous SNR at Bob given by
(7) and γE is the instantaneous SNR at Eve given by (8).
According to the definition, the secrecy outage probability is
formulated as
Pout (Rs) = Pr (Cs < Rs) . (10)
We commence our analysis by presenting the probability
density functions (pdfs) of γB and γE . Specifically, we adopt
[16, Eq. (15)] as the pdf of γB , fγB (γ), and define γB as
the average per-antenna SNR at Bob. We note that α1 and α2
are equivalent to two random transmit antennas for Eve. As
such, the pdf of γE , fγE (γ), is given by [16, Eq. (15)] with
NA = 2. We further define γE as the average per-antenna
SNR at Eve.
We now proceed with the calculation of the secrecy outage
probability. Specifically, we rewrite Pout (Rs) as
Pout(Rs) =Pr(Cs < Rs|γB > γE)× Pr(γB > γE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
V1
+ Pr(γB < γE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
V2
, (11)
where V1 is derived as
V1 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2Rs (1+γE)−1
γE
fγE (γE)fγB (γB)dγBdγE
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2Rs (1+γE)−1
0
fγE (γE)fγB (γB)dγBdγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
U1
−
∫ ∞
0
∫ γE
0
fγE (γE)fγB (γB)dγBdγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
U2
. (12)
It is easy to observe that U2 = V2. As such, we simplify
Pout (Rs) as Pout (Rs) = U1.
To derive U1, we first calculate the inner integral with
respect to γB by substituting fγB (γ) and fγE (γ) into U1 and
applying [17, Eq. (3.351.1)]. We then expand the product of
the inner integral and fγE (γ) by applying [17, Eq. (1.111)]
and solve the resultant integral with respect to γE by applying
[17, Eq. (3.351.3)]. By performing some algebraic manipula-
tions, the secrecy outage probability is derived as
Pout(Rs) = 1−
NA(NA − 1) [Ψ1 −Ψ2 +Ψ3 −Ψ4]
[(NB − 1)! (NE − 1)!]
2 , (13)
Ψ1 =
NA−2∑
i=0
NB−1∑
j=0
NE−1∑
m=0
(−1)i+1G
(NB−1)i∑
t=0
at(NB , i)
ω1+k∑
k=0
(
2Rs γ¯E
γ¯B
)ω1 k!(ω1+k
k
)
2ω1(i+ 2)k+1
e
−
(2Rs−1)(i+2)
γ¯B
ω1∑
u=0
(
ω1
u
)(
2− 21−Rs
γ¯E
)ω1−u
×
[
2NE−m−2∑
n=0
n!
(
2NE−m−2
n
)
22NE−m−2
F1(ϕ1) +
NE−m−1∑
q=0
(−1)q
(
NE−m−1
q
)
2NE+q−1(NE + q)
F2(ϕ1)
]
, (13a)
Ψ2 =
NB−1∑
j=0
NE−1∑
m=0
H
NB−j−1∑
p=0
(−1)p
(
NB−j−1
p
)
2NB+p−1(NB + p)
(
2Rs γ¯E
γ¯B
)2NB−j−1
e
−
(2Rs+1−2)
γ¯B
2NB−j−1∑
u=0
(
2NB − j − 1
u
)(
2− 21−Rs
γ¯E
)2NB−j−u−1
×
[
2NE−m−2∑
n=0
n!
(
2NE−m−2
n
)
22NE−m−1
F1(ϕ2) +
NE−m−1∑
q=0
(−1)q
(
NE−m−1
q
)
2NE+q(NE + q)
F2(ϕ2)
]
, (13b)
Ψ3 =
NA−2∑
i=1
NB−1∑
j=0
NE−1∑
m=0
(−1)iG
(NB−1)i∑
t=0
at(NB , i)
NB−j−1∑
p=0
(−1)p
(
NB − j − 1
p
)
ω2+k∑
k=0
k!
(
ω2+k
k
)
2ω2 ik+1
(
2Rs γ¯E
γ¯B
)ω1
e
−
(2Rs−1)(i+2)
γ¯B
×
ω1∑
u=0
(
ω1
u
)(
2− 21−Rs
γ¯E
)ω1−u [2NE−m−2∑
n=0
n!
(
2NE−m−2
n
)
22NE−m−2
F1(ϕ1) +
NE−m−1∑
q=0
(−1)q
(
NE−m−1
q
)
2NE+q−1(NE + q)
F2(ϕ1)
]
, (13c)
Ψ4 =
NA−2∑
i=1
NB−1∑
j=0
NE−1∑
m=0
(−1)i+1G
(NB−1)i∑
t=0
at(NB , i)
NB−j−1∑
p=0
(−1)p
(
NB−j−1
p
)
(NB + p+ t− 1)!
iNB+p+t
(
2Rs γ¯E
γ¯B
)ω3
e
−
(2Rs+1−2)
γ¯B
×
ω3∑
u=0
(
ω3
u
)(
2− 21−Rs
γ¯E
)ω3−u [2NE−m−2∑
n=0
n!
(
2NE−m−2
n
)
22NE−m−2
F1(ϕ2) +
NE−m−1∑
q=0
(−1)q
(
NE−m−1
q
)
2NE+q−1(NE + q)
F2(ϕ2)
]
. (13d)
where Ψ1, Ψ2, Ψ3 and Ψ4 are presented in (13a), (13b), (13c)
and (13d), respectively. In (13a), (13b), (13c) and (13d), we
define variables ω1 = 2NB+t−j−k−2, ω2 = NB+p+t−1,
ω3 = NB − j − p − 1, λ = 2NE + u − m − n − 3, ϕ1 =
γB+2
Rs−1(i+2)γE
γB
, and ϕ2 = γB+2
RsγE
γB
. We also define the
functions
G =
(
NA − 2
i
)
j!
(
NB − 1
j
)
m!
(
NE − 1
m
)
,
H = j!
(
NB − 1
j
)
m!
(
NE − 1
m
)
,
F1(ϕ) = (2NE −m− n− 2)W (λ, ϕ)−W (λ+ 1, ϕ) ,
and
F2(ϕ) = (2NE −m− 2)W (λ, ϕ)−W (λ+ 1, ϕ) .
We further define at(NB, i) as the coefficients of zt for 0 ≤
t ≤ i(NB − 1), which arises from the expansion of(
Nb−1∑
k=0
zk
k!
)i
, (14)
and define W(r, u) for u > 0 in F1(ϕ) and F2(ϕ) as
W(r, u)=
∫ ∞
0
xre−uxdx=
{
r!u−r−1, if r = 0, 1, 2, ...
0, if r = −1.
(15)
It is highlighted that our new expression in (13) is in closed
form as it involves finite summations of exponential functions
and power functions.
B. Probability of Non-zero Secrecy Capacity
The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity is defined as
the probability by which the secrecy capacity is larger than
zero. As such, it is expressed as
Pr (Cs > 0) = Pr (γB > γE)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γB
0
fγB (γB) fγE (γE) dγEdγB . (16)
Substituting fγB (γ) and fγE (γ) into (16) and solving the
resultant integrals, the explicit expression for Pr (Cs > 0) is
obtained. Due to page limits, the explicit expression is omitted
here. Instead, we present Pr (Cs > 0) in terms of the secrecy
outage probability as
Pr (Cs > 0) = 1− Pout (0) . (17)
C. ε-Outage Secrecy Capacity
The ε-outage secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum
secrecy rate for which the secrecy outage probability is no
larger than ε. Specifically, it is characterized as
Cout (ε) = argmax
Pout(Rs)≤ε
Rs. (18)
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability versus γB for Rs = 1, γE = 5 dB,
NB = 3, and NE = 2.
Substituting (13) into (18) and applying numerical root find-
ing, Cout (ε) is obtained.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to examine the
impact of the number of antennas and the average SNRs on
the secrecy performance. Specifically, we conduct a thorough
performance comparison between our TAS-Alamouti scheme
with the single TAS scheme in [12]. This comparison high-
lights the potential of TAS-Alamouti.
We first examine the impact of NA on the secrecy outage
probability. Fig. 2 plots Pout (Rs) versus γB for different NA.
In this figure, the theoretical TAS-Alamouti curve is generated
from (13), and the theoretical single TAS curve is generated
from [12, Eq. (13)]. We first observe that Pout (Rs) of TAS-
Alamouti significantly decreases as NA increases. Moreover,
we observe that TAS-Alamouti achieves a lower Pout (Rs)
than single TAS when γB is in the medium and high regime.
For example, TAS-Alamouti outperforms single TAS when
γB > 10 dB for NA = 3. This is due to the fact that more
transmit energy is wasted on the second strongest antenna
for Eve than for Bob at medium and high γB . Furthermore,
we observe that TAS-Alamouti provides a higher Pout (Rs)
than single TAS when γB is low. As such, it is easy to
determine the crossover point at which TAS-Alamouti and
single TAS achieve the same performance. Notably, we find
that the value of γB at the crossover point decreases as
NA increases. This can be explained by the fact that the
two selected transmit antennas are determined by Bob and
the freedom of α increases with NA. Finally, we observe
that the theoretical curves match precisely with the Monte
Carlo simulations. This verifies the correctness of our analysis.
Monte Carlo simulations are omitted in other figures to avoid
cluttering.
We next examine the impact of NB and NE on the secrecy
outage probability. Fig. 3 plots Pout (Rs) versus γB for
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability versus γB for Rs = 1, γE = 5 dB,
NA = 4, and NE = 2.
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Fig. 4. The secrecy outage probability versus γB for Rs = 1, γE = 5 dB,
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different NB . In this figure, we observe that Pout (Rs) of TAS-
Alamouti profoundly decreases as NB increases. Moreover, we
observe that the value of γB at the crossover point decreases as
NB increases. This is due to the fact that larger NB increases
the freedom of fα. Fig. 4 plots Pout (Rs) versus γB for
different NE . In this figure, we observe that Pout (Rs) of TAS-
Alamouti increases as NE increases. In addition, we observe
that the value of γB at the crossover point increases as NE
increases. This arises from the fact that larger NE increases
the freedom of gα.
We now focus our attention on the probability of non-
zero secrecy capacity. Fig. 5 plots Pout (Rs) versus γB for
different γE . In this figure, the theoretical TAS-Alamouti curve
is generated from (16), and the theoretical single TAS curve
is generated from [12, Eq. (29)]. From Fig. 5, we see that the
Pr (Cs > 0) of TAS-Alamouti is higher than that of single
TAS when γB is larger than a specific value. In particular,
we observe that the value of γB at the crossover point is
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Fig. 5. The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity versus γB for NA = 4,
NB = 3, and NE = 2.
around γE . Notably, this value increases as γE increases.
Additionally, we observe that Pr (Cs > 0) of TAS-Alamouti
still exists when γB < γE .
Finally, we examine the ε-outage secrecy capacity. Fig. 6
plots Cout(ε) versus NA for different NE . In this figure, the
theoretical TAS-Alamouti curve is generated from (18), and
the theoretical single TAS curve is generated from [12, Eq.
(31)]. From this figure, we see that Cout(ε) of TAS-Alamouti
increases with NA but decreases with NE . We also see that
TAS-Alamouti achieves a higher Cout(ε) than single TAS
when NA is larger than a certain value.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we have introduced a new TAS-Alamouti
scheme for physical layer security enhancement in MIMO
wiretap channels. Adopting non-identical Rayleigh fading be-
tween the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel, we
derived a new closed-form expression for the secrecy outage
probability, based on which the probability of non-zero secrecy
capacity and ε-outage secrecy capacity were characterized.
We proved that the our TAS-Alamouti scheme achieves lower
secrecy outage probability than the single TAS scheme when
the SNR of the main channel is in the medium and high
regime relative to the SNR of the eavesdropper’s channel.
Future directions for our new scheme include its integration
with location verification techniques [18] [19] for even more
enhanced security at the wireless physical layer.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was funded by The University of New South
Wales and Australian Research Council Grant DP120102607.
REFERENCES
[1] Y.-S. Shiu, S. Y. Chang, H.-C. Wu, S. C.-H. Huang, and H.-H. Chen,
“Physical layer security in wireless networks: A tutorial,” IEEE Commun.
Mag., vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 66–74, Apr. 2011.
[2] H. V. Poor, “Information and inference in the wireless physical layer,”
IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 40–47, Feb. 2012.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3.6
4.1
4.6
5.1
5.6
6.1
NA
C
o
u
t
(ε
)
 
 
NE = 1
NE = 2
Theoretic Single TAS
Theoretic TAS-Alamouti
Fig. 6. The ε-outage secrecy capacity versus NA for ε = 0.01, γB = 20 dB,
γE = 0 dB, and NB = 2.
[3] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell Syst.
Techn. J., vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 656–715, Oct. 1949.
[4] A. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Techn. J., vol. 54, no. 8, pp.
1355–1387, Oct. 1975.
[5] S. K. Leung-Yan-Cheong and M. E. Hellman, “The Gaussian wire-tap
channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 451–456, Jul. 1978.
[6] A. Khisti and G. W. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple
antennas–Part II: The MIMOME wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, vol. 56, no. 11, pp. 5515–5532, Nov. 2010.
[7] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap
channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 8, pp. 4961–4972, Aug.
2011.
[8] S. Goel and R. Negi, “Guaranteeing secrecy using artificial noise,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 2180–2189, Jun. 2008.
[9] A. Mukherjee and A. L. Swindlehurst, “Robust beamforming for secrecy
in MIMO wiretap channels with imperfect CSI,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 351–361, Jan. 2011.
[10] M. Bloch, J. Barros, M. Rodrigues, and S. McLaughlin, “Wireless
information-theoretic security,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6,
pp. 2515–2534, Jun. 2008.
[11] H. Alves, R. D. Souza, M. Debbah, and M. Bennis, “Performance of
transmit antenna selection physical layer security schemes,” IEEE Signal
Process. Lett., vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 372–375, Jun. 2012.
[12] N. Yang, P. L. Yeoh, M. Elkashlan, R. Schober, and I. B. Collings,
“Secure transmission via transmit antenna selection in MIMO wiretap
channels,” in Proc. IEEE GlobeCOM, Anaheim, CA, Dec. 2012, pp. 807–
812.
[13] N. Yang, P. L. Yeoh, M. Elkashlan, R. Schober, and I. B. Collings,
“Transmit antenna selection for security enhancement in MIMO wiretap
channels,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 144–154, Jan. 2013.
[14] J. Yuan, “Adaptive transmit antenna selection with pragmatic space-time
trellis codes,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 5, no. 7, pp. 1706–
1715, Jul. 2006.
[15] S. Alamouti, “A simple transmit diversity technique for wireless com-
munications,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 16, no. 8, pp. 1451–1458,
Oct. 1998.
[16] Z. Chen, J. Yuan, B. Vucetic, and Z. Zhou, “Performance of Alamouti
scheme with transmit antenna selection,” Electron. Lett., vol. 39, pp.
1666–1668, Nov. 2003.
[17] I. S. Gradshteyn and I. M. Ryzhik, Table of Integrals, Series and
Products, 7th ed., Academic, San Diego, CA, 2007.
[18] R. A. Malaney, “Securing Wi-Fi networks with position verification:
extended version,” International J. Security Netw., vol. 2, pp. 27–36, Mar.
2007.
[19] S. Yan, R. Malaney, I. Nevat, and G. Peters, “An information theoretic
location verification system for wireless networks,” in Proc. IEEE Globe-
COM, Anaheim, CA, Dec. 2012, pp. 5637–5642.
